

Candidate Selection at the State Level: An Empirical Study of Peoples' Democratic Party Gubernatorial Primaries in North West Nigeria

¹Yahaya Musa Yusuf & ²Musa, Umar Adam

^{1&2}Department of Political Science, Bauchi State University, Gadau

¹Yusufpols2009@yahoo.co.uk, +23470647747756

²musa.ibn@gmail.com, +2348030761691

Abstract

Political parties are central to modern democracy. Researchers have, for a long time contended that meaningful political parties are necessary for a thriving democratic system. Candidates' selection is among the foremost programmes every political party carry out before participating in a general election. It is believed that candidates' selection has a consequence to a political party in the end. This paper attempts to empirically examine factors that determine gubernatorial candidate selection in North West Nigeria. Three states were selected and questionnaires distributed to the delegates whom were selected using the cluster probability sampling. The results were analysed using simple regression and it shows that party elites, and incumbency factors negatively influence gubernatorial candidate selection. Party benefactor has a positive effect to the aspirant but has negative effect on the gubernatorial process in the North West of Nigeria. It is recommended that the party should overhaul its laws to impose stiffer penalties on those defaulting party laws of congresses. The election management body as well should disqualify defaulting aspirants and deregister any wanting party.

Keywords: Incumbency, party benefactor, factionalism, candidate selection, political party, election.

Introduction

Political parties are central to modern democracy. Researchers have, for a long time contended that meaningful political parties are necessary for a thriving democratic system (Snyder and Ting, 2011). LaPalombara and Weiner argued that they are a creature of modern and modernising political system. In any political system, be it democratic or totalitarian, the political party in whatever form is important (Lapalombara, and Weiner, 1972). They provide policy programmes through which candidates aspiring for political positions contest elections in a competitive democracy. In their seminal study, Hazan and Rahat are of the opinion that candidates' selection is among the foremost programmes every political party carry out before participating in a general election (Rahat, 2009; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). It is believed that candidates' selection has a consequence to a political party in the end. This is because the lack of openness and equity in the way and manner party's candidates are selected may possibly breeds dispute in the party and above all affect its possibility of electoral success in the period of general elections (Tenuche, 2011). In his opinion, Omoruyi (2001) maintained that political parties are seen as mechanisms that bring about some desired

changes or pave way for a change from one party government to a highly diverse and competitive political system. This is possible when there is internal party contest among aspirants based on the democratic standards which sometimes show how the parties make their candidate selection.

Evolving tools for the study of candidates' selection methods is significant in two major aspects. Firstly, when someone studies party politics, appropriate tool allows him to draw a proper understanding of a major element in the party's internal power arrangement. Secondly, if he claims that the behaviour of parties is influenced by the nature of the electoral system, then the behaviour of individual politician must also be influenced by the way and manner selection method is used (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Based on this, there are diverse strategies through which political parties choose their candidates. In some political systems, the procedure of candidate choice is guided by a defined legal framework of that given political system, while in others there is greater amenability with the parties in deciding how their candidates ought to be chosen (Maiyo, 2008a; Maiyo, 2008b).

This paper examined candidates' selection within the framework of guiding principles of

political parties in Nigeria's political system in the Fourth Republic¹. In the recently concluded 2015 general elections, the ever ruling PDP, for the first time in the historical record of democracy in Nigerian political system suffered a heavy defeat to the opposition across the country. The INEC released results which showed that at the presidential election, the margin is 66% in favour of the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) and PDP has only 34% (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2015; INEC, 2015).

One fall-out of this dominance by the PDP at the national and the state levels as the largest party of the Fourth Republic in the country is the issue of internal party democracy, especially candidates' selection. Scholars and partisan politicians alike all attributed this big defeat to the lack of internal party democracy and poor culture of candidates' selection. To substantiate this argument, the former chairman of PDP Alhaji Bamanga Tukur lamented that PDP suffered a big defeat in the 2015 general elections as a result of disobeying party rules governing internal democracy. He further said in PDP we have been preaching selection not election, imposition not internal democracy that characterised political conduct in PDP (Mohammed, 2015). This indicates that absence of or weak internal party democracy in the PDP could have been one of the major causes of its failure in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria.

Therefore, it is imperative to undertake an empirical study that can provide an explanation

for the failure of a once strong ruling party as PDP in Nigeria. Part of the reasons for the interest in selecting PDP in this study is the fact that, it was the only political party that remained in existence for about seventeen years since 1998 after its formation at the end of General Abdulsalam Abubakar military junta. The objective of this paper is to determine factors that influence PDP gubernatorial candidates' selection in North-West Nigeria.

Conceptual Framework

Nominating candidates is one of the most fundamental functions of political parties in liberal representative democracies. Parties have, at one time or the other, evolved different mechanisms and methods through which their candidates emerge. However, no matter what method is used, it is within the framework of participation, representation and inclusiveness and this is under two broad categories: direct or indirect primaries (Rahat, 2009). Developing a mechanism to explain candidate selection is very vital in the sense that it explains the endogenous structure, power relations and exogenous political system (Rahat and Hazan, 2001).

Therefore, this paper adopted Rahat and Hazan (2001) conceptual framework of analysis to guide the study. This framework considers some factors: internal and external that influence candidate selection. Using Inclusive-Exclusive framework, they develop an analytical framework for the study of candidate selection. This is shown in figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1: Candidate Selection Framework

Source: Rahat & Hazan, Democracy within Parties, 2006.

Based on the above, this paper adopted the above framework for analysis. The PDP constitution adopts indirect primary as a method in candidate selection. Nevertheless, some factors are at play in the process which this paper evaluated. These factors interact with one another and their relationship is not always mutual, hence affecting the process of credible candidate selection within a political party. These factors that influence delegates' behaviour (electorate) as well as the process

when it comes to candidate selection are party elite (party executives), incumbency, factionalism and party benefactors factors and they ultimately affect the political party in the long-run during the general election. This paper used these factors as the framework for analysis as depicted in Figure 1.2 below as adapted from figure 1.1 above.




Figure 1.2: Framework for Analysis of Candidate Selection

Figure 1.2 shows the variables presumed to be at play in gubernatorial candidate selection. For the parties that use indirect selection method, the framework in figure 1.2 identifies the dominant factors and considerations that shape gubernatorial candidates' selection process of political parties in most emerging democracies. It shows party elites (party executives), incumbency (serving president, governors, MPs), factionalism, party benefactors or patrons and ethno- religious sentiments as factors influencing gubernatorial candidate selection during party primaries. The framework consists of independent variables comprising of party elites, incumbency, factionalism and party benefactors while the dependent variable is the credible candidate selection and outcome of the dependent variable is the electoral success.

Methodology

When studying candidate selection, the unit of analysis is a single party in a particular country at a specific time period. This is because candidate selection is a periodic event done by political parties. Therefore, generalisation is limited to that political party being studied. But in those situations in which a number of political parties in a given country use same technique to choose their candidates due to juridical requirements one can begin to make generalisation about the candidate selection process in the political system (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). Against this backdrop, this study is a cross-sectional which involves the collection of data at a given time, and as well focus on considering correlations among variables at a given time (Mann, 2003). The paper employed the use of quantitative method for data collection and analysis. The primary data were obtained quantitatively using questionnaires to the statutory delegates (respondents) that took part during the 2011 and 2014 PDP gubernatorial congresses for the

selection of aspirants as candidates during the party primaries in Kaduna, Kano and Zamfara States, Nigeria. This was necessary because these delegates came together from their respective constituencies to represent their party members in nominating gubernatorial candidates for those general elections. According to the PDP electoral guidelines for party congresses at the states levels to choose governorship aspirants, there should be a special convention in the respective state capital and each delegate cast his vote in the selection process date determined by the party national working committee (PDP, 2014). So these delegates' opinions matter in this paper. The scope of this study is North-West Nigeria. This area consists of seven states according to the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Constitution as amended). These are Kaduna State, Kano State, Katsina State, Kebbi State, Jigawa State, Sokoto State and Zamfara State. The states were grouped into three because some states were created from the others. For instance, Jigawa State was carved out of Kano State, Katsina State was also carved out of Kaduna State and Sokoto State produced both Kebbi and Zamfara states. Looking at this nature, the study focused on Kaduna, Kano and Zamfara states which are capable of representing the entire North West geopolitical divide.

The study targeted population is the statutory delegates nominated for the purpose of gubernatorial candidate selection in the study area. Therefore, the population of this study was both the delegates in the three states (Kaduna, Kano and Zamfara) who took part in the PDP candidate selection. There is in total 2646 statutory delegates as the population from these states according to the PDP list of delegate register (PDP Delegates Register, n.d). The population is geographically confined to three states which consist of 81 local governments.

Kaduna has 23, Zamfara has 14 and Kano has 44 local governments. The number of delegates from each of the 81 local governments depends on the number of wards each has as the lowest political units in Nigeria. According to PDP gubernatorial primary elections guidelines of 2011 and 2014, (PDP Electoral Guidelines, 2014) each ward elects three delegates for the purpose of selecting gubernatorial candidate. These delegates in turn represent the party in choosing the party's flag-bearers in the special congresses for the nomination of the candidates. The paper used probability sampling due to the fact that it has a sampling frame.

A cluster sample was used to draw the sample size from the three states using senatorial district as a cluster. A cluster sample is a probability sampling method whereby the population of the study is subdivided into various clusters and in the next step, simple random or systematic sample is used to select the final elements of the study proportionally from the different clusters in a multi-method approach. This type of sampling is used in a situation whereby the study wants to show some specific subgroups in the population of study. In cluster sampling, the population is partitioned into non-overlapping groups, called cluster and a sample is selected by some design within each cluster such as systematic or random methods. Based on this study, in order to select a sample size from the population, the researcher relied on calculation of sample size done by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). For that, the study determined 335 to be

statistically adequate sample size for the 2646 population. This is based on the sample size calculation by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). But, to have equal representation from every one of the states under study, 450 was used giving each state 150 elements in the samples from each state based on the principle of proportionality. This was due to the fact that a research tends to have high degree of having better result if the sample is large and it increases confidence level of 5% margin error (Korzilius, 2010). Krejcie and Morgan (1970) determined the sample size with 5% Standard Error.

Survey Result

Party Elite (Party executives) and gubernatorial candidates' selection

A simple regression in Table 1 shows a significant regression with party executives as independent variable and candidates' selection as dependent variable in which ($B = -.159$, $t = -3.416$, $p = .001$). The result of the table demonstrated that 'party executives' negatively impact on candidates' selection.

The individual regression analysis revealed that party executives negatively and significantly affect candidates' selection with F value of 11.667 and beta value of $-.159$. Hence, an additional unit of party executives will negatively impact candidate selection by $-.159$. Therefore, party elite (party executives) negatively influence gubernatorial candidates' selection.

Table 1 Simple Regression of Party Elite and Candidate Selection

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	4.222	.266		15.881	.000
Party_Elite	-.237	.069	-.159	-3.416	.001

a. Dependent Variable: Candidate_Selection

Incumbency (Serving governor) and candidates' selection

A simple regression in Table 2 shows a significant regression with incumbency (serving governor) as independent variable and candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B = -.127$, $t = -2.711$, $p = .007$). The result demonstrated that

incumbency (serving governor) has a negative impact on candidates' selection. Furthermore, the regression analysis revealed that incumbency (a serving governor) negatively and significantly affects candidate selection with F value of 7.348 and beta value of $-.127$. Hence, an additional unit of incumbency (serving

governor) increased the lack of credibility of candidates' selection by -.127. Therefore,

incumbency (the serving governor) influenced candidates' selection.

Table 2 Simple Regression of Incumbency and Candidate Selection

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	4.207	.328		12.836	.000
Incumbency_Fact or	-.226	.083	-.127	-2.711	.007

a. Dependent Variable: Candidate_Selection

Factions within political party and gubernatorial candidates' selection

A simple regression in Table 3 shows a significant regression model with faction within the political party as independent variable and candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B=-.198$, $t=-4.286$, $p=.000$). The result demonstrated that factions within the political party have a negative impact on candidate selection.

The individual regression analysis revealed that factions within the political party negatively and significantly affect candidate selection with F value of 18.367 and beta value of -.198. Hence, an additional unit of factions within the political party will increase candidate selection by 0.189. Therefore, factions within political party have negative effect on gubernatorial candidate selection.

Table 3 Simple Regression of Factionalism and Candidate Selection

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	4.508	.279		16.138	.000
Factionalism	-.305	.071	-.198	-4.286	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Candidate_Selection

The effect of party benefactors in party candidates' selection

A simple regression analysis shown in Table 4 shows a significant regression model with party benefactors as independent variable and candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B=.493$, $t=11.985$, $p=.000$). The result demonstrated that party benefactors have positive impact on candidate selection.

The regression analysis further revealed that party benefactors positively and significantly affect candidate selection with F

value of 143.647 and beta value of .493. Hence, an additional unit of party benefactors will increase candidate selection by .493. Therefore, party benefactors have positive relevance in party gubernatorial candidate selection. The result is positive because most of the candidates rely heavily on third party who finance their candidacy. Therefore, godfathers boost the candidacy of aspirants but negatively affect the credibility of candidate selection. Due to the fact that godfathers in most cases bribed delegates to favour their godson candidates.

Table 4 Simple Regression of Party Benefactor and Candidate Selection

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	.021	.279		.074	.941
Party Benefactor	.925	.077	.493	11.985	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Candidate_Selection

Discussion

Nigeria's political parties are riddled with internal strife and multiple crises. The situation in the PDP exemplifies that general tendency. In the PDP of today, all known rules of democracy have been thwarted. The party does not care about the processes of election or selection. It violates them at will. In the party, it is not the people that make choice; it is the few who have seized the instruments of power that impose their will on the people. If democracy is to throw open the polity for mass participation in political affairs, the PDP would have shrunk the political space, thus making democracy look like a closed shop (Obi, 2005 as cited in Agbaje and Adejumo, 2006).

This made experts in party politics to conclude that lack of internal democracy in Nigerian political parties has become a persistent threat to the country's nascent democracy. Party primaries throughout the country clearly show that Nigerian political parties are not operating within the norms of democratic principles. Various political parties have failed to adopt the provisions of the party's constitutions to all party members who are eligible and want to run for office in their party primaries. Some candidates were imposed on the party without election and due process (Mbah, 2011). The lack of an effective monitoring mechanism for internal party democratic processes for candidate nomination and INEC's inability to reject nominated aspirants (who emerged in dubious circumstances) had negative implications for the credibility of the entire process (Onapajo, 2015). Internal party democracy in the nomination of party candidates for elections weakens party unity and institutionalization, and negatively affects democratic consolidation. This is because arbitrariness in candidate nomination reduces the level of commitment of party stalwarts and invariably that of their supporters, which negatively affects party cohesion, stability, and

performance (Ikenyeabe, 2014). Likoti (2005) for instance, posits that "the lack of intra-party democracy is likely not only to weaken parties internally, but may adversely influence their effectiveness in driving democracy nationally, especially in emergent democracies." This is because it negatively affected their performance during election. In Nigeria, party primaries as an aspect of internal party democracy have become as turbulent and as problematic as the general elections that succeed them. Many of the political parties, especially the dominant ones, have discarded the written democratic procedures for candidate and leadership selection in preference for imposition, consensus and manipulated primaries that unleash a lot of problems ranging from intra-party factionalization, defections, legal tussles, and violent measures that threaten democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria. The drift towards anarchy that characterizes party primaries in Nigeria leaves one sceptical about the possibility of intra party democracy promoting democratization process and democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Obianyo, Ikenna and Igabariam, 2013). Ibrahim Jibril concludes that Nigeria has an illiberal democratic regime in which strict guidelines, defined by the constitution and monitored by INEC govern the registration of political parties. The guidelines seek to ensure that all parties have a national, non-sectarian vision. But the parties have a persistent tendency to factionalize and fractionalize. To understand this kind of mafia-style activity in Nigerian politics, it is important to note that many political parties are operated by political "godfathers," who use money and violence to control the political process. They decide party nominations and campaign outcomes, and when candidates try to steer an independent course, they use their preferred candidates (Ibrahim, 2007).

The point being made is that the PDP authoritarianism in the form of lack of internal democracy, imposition of candidates and party executives, and incumbency factor have a number of consequences which include party factionalization, internal crisis, defection/carpet crossing, etc. (Aniche, 2015). There were numerous allegations that delegates were offered financial inducements in exchange for votes. State-level primaries were marred by allegations of misconduct and a number of violent incidents. The most contentious primaries were related to the selection of PDP candidates. Abundant legal complications surround the selection of candidates particularly for states (National Democratic Institute, 2012). One of the ways in which American parties are unquestionably different from those in other countries is the extent to which the nomination of candidates is controlled by state law and carried out under the auspices of the state itself especially state governorship (Alan, 1996). This paper has reached some significant findings regarding gubernatorial candidates' selection and the PDP's performance in North-West Nigeria with emphasis on the three states of Kaduna, Kano and Zamfara. The findings have rejected the null hypotheses thereby confirming the positive relationships among the variables of this study.

In the first place, party elites (Party executives) negatively influenced gubernatorial candidate selection in North-West Nigeria. A simple regression showed a significant regression with party elites (party executives) as independent variable and candidates' selection as dependent variable in which ($B = -.159$, $t = -3.416$, $p = .001$). The result demonstrated that 'party elites' negatively impact on candidates' selection. The individual regression analysis revealed that party executives negatively and significantly affect candidates' selection with F value of 11.667 and beta value of $-.159$. Hence, an additional unit of party executives will negatively impact candidate selection by $-.159$. Therefore, party elite (party executives) negatively influence gubernatorial candidates' selection. So a decrease in the influence of party elites will boost the credibility of the PDP candidate selection. During the 2011 party primaries for the election of party candidates, the PDP leadership had virtually appropriated the space and conducted selection, not election. Most of the political parties grossly

manipulated the primaries, and in many cases the results of the primaries conducted by state chapters of the party were not respected. Several candidates who did not win the primaries were eventually selected by the leaders of the party, claiming a fake logic of party supremacy in the selection of party candidates to compete for general elections (Adejumo, 2007). After the defeat in the 2015 general elections, the national leadership of the PDP maintained a position where it realized its past mistakes by acknowledging that, party primaries would no longer be hijacked by money bags and very influential members of the party. According to the PDP, henceforth, party primaries would allow zero expenses by rich stakeholder to allow for the poor and very popular as well as acceptable candidates, adding that the PDP was prepared to take the party back to the people in line with the motto of the party. In line with this new orientation, Uche Secondus, the former acting chairman of the PDP insisted that the era of automatic tickets for candidates was over. The intention for him was to make the party primaries zero expensive, so that nobody would induce anybody. The aim was to revolutionize the party so that the idea of money bag controlling the party would be eliminated. The party wanted every member to participate in the party activities by paying their dues. Through this, the party could eliminate the class syndrome and bring the party back to the people. The party belonged to all and should not be in the hands of few money bag politicians. The party had to be returned to the people (Henry, 2015). This shows that the party had long been under the dictatorship of the elite of the party against the general will of the party grassroots members who neither influenced nor participated in the internal party affairs of the party.

On the role of party leadership and other benefactors in the candidate selection process in North-West Nigeria, party executives and party benefactors had in one way or the other played roles in gubernatorial candidate selection. In states where the aspirant was an incumbent like in Kaduna, the executives mostly danced to the tune of the incumbent governor. The executives allegedly dictated to the delegates to vote for a given candidate. While in other states like Zamfara and Kano, delegates mostly danced to the tune of the executives to vote for a candidate with strong godfathers and great support from

the executives. In response on whether PDP leadership in these states influenced candidates' selection, some respondents were of the opinion that it did not while others testified to the influence of leadership in candidate selection in one way or another. Overwhelmingly, the respondents argued that they did not as party executives influence candidate selection. However, one respondent consistently maintained the position that party executives had influenced the process of candidate selection. The executives in some cases used the word "advice" as an alternative to mean that the executives had great control on the delegates to influence the process by guiding the delegates on whom to vote for. This confirmed one of the researcher's assertions that mostly the executives in most cases danced to the tune of an aspirant especially in states where the aspirant was an incumbent. Based on the above analysis, Alan Ware (1996) argued that "clearly, one of the areas in which we might expect to find evidence of elite influence is in candidate selection. Those who control the machinery of the party may be able to structure the voice of candidate facing the party members".

Also, on the influence of incumbency (serving governor) candidate selection, a simple regression indicated a significant regression with incumbency (serving governor) as independent variable and credible candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B = -.127$, $t = -2.711$, $p = .007$). The result demonstrated that incumbency (serving governor) has a negative impact on candidates' selection. This is because both in 2011 and 2014, serving governors that presented themselves to the party for self-continuation of second mandate used the advantage of the state resources at their disposal to secure victory.

Furthermore, the regression analysis revealed that incumbency (a serving governor) negatively and significantly affects candidate selection with F value of 7.348 and beta value of $-.127$. Hence, an additional unit of serving governor's influence increased the lack of credibility of candidates' selection by $-.127$. Therefore, incumbency (the serving governor) negatively influenced candidates' selection to his own favour. So, for a credible candidate selection, the power of incumbency must be controlled by the party laws and national standing rules of party candidate selection. At

the level of the party, the power of incumbency also gave the incumbent an undue advantage over others during the conduct of party primary elections at the intra-party level. This argument was supported by the submission of Hazan and Rahat (2006) that when the electorates are inclusive, that is composed of party members at large, support cannot be based on personal affiliations and incumbency is thus likely to offer a larger advantage. This is mainly because, as public officials, incumbents enjoy publicity and the ability to demonstrate responsiveness to the demands of the electorate, interest groups and financial supporters. The events of electoral and party politics in Nigeria since the return of democracy are good cases for the illustration of the manifestation of the abuse of incumbency power by the incumbent officials and political parties. When incumbents run for re-election, they win over 85 percent of the time and typically with over 60 per cent of the vote. In 2011, 17 of Nigeria's 20 then incumbent State Governors got re-elected with an average winning vote of 69 per cent (Owen and Zainab, 2015). Lack of internal party democracy was sustained through incumbency factor in situations where sitting executives were given automatic ticket by the PDP to run under the party platform (Egboh and Aniche, 2012). It is almost unthinkable to contest primary election in the same party with an incumbent state governor in any of the parties or contest for any party position without being endorsed by the governor of the ruling party in any state (Agudigwu and Ezeani, 2015). In control of the party structure, the governor remains in control of the party in his state except if there arose a force of greater or equal control of resources (money and goodwill from the presidency or high echelon of the party) and in that case a challenge could be sustained against his interest. It was the rise of some forces and the control of resources equal or greater to that of the various governors that gave rise to the electoral misfortunes of some of the governors and that situation created the impression of change in the electoral culture of the parties in 2011. This is because the incumbent governors had created splinter groups within the party as a result of denial of giving equal opportunity to other aspirants.

On factionalism, simple regression showed a significant regression with faction within the political party as independent variable and

candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B=-.198$, $t=-4.286$, $p=.000$). The result demonstrated that factions within the political party have a negative impact on candidate selection.

The individual regression analysis revealed that factions within the political party negatively and significantly affect candidate selection with F value of 18.367 and beta value of $-.198$. Hence, an additional unit of factions within the political party will increase the negativity or problem of candidate selection by 0.198. Therefore, factions within political party have negative effect on gubernatorial candidate selection.

Within political parties, conflicts may occur time and again because of different perceptions on political issues, as well as due to personal rivalries for positions and influence. These conflicts are inevitable and legitimate, but must be argued out in a correct manner. Within a party, there is always a concurrence of power and influence; this is part of everyday business. Factionalism was not a new phenomenon in the political dictionary of the PDP. The party had suffered a great deal of factionalism either because of leadership or candidate selection. This might be the end result of why some party members decamped to another party. In a report of the PDP reconciliation committee of Kaduna state, it was argued that Political rancour, and to some extent antiparty activities were some of the common and noticeable consequences of primary elections which every political party would try to minimise or avert. The experience was indeed a worrisome trend and a disturbing phenomenon that posed a big challenge to the success of all political parties at both primary and general elections.

In short, there is no state controlled by the PDP where the party did not record intra-party crisis. The prelude to 2015 is even more worrisome, as the lingering intra-party conflict in the PDP tore it into two on August 31, 2013. The crisis ensued with the airing of grievances by some members who were not pleased with the leadership of the party (Bashir and Yahaya, 2015) and candidate selection. It is important to note that, internal democracy is most required in the selection of candidates for elective positions both within and outside elections, but in PDP as in other parties, it was observed that what normally caused factionalisation or conflicts was the issue of selection of candidates through

party primaries for elective positions in the general elections (Ojukwu and Olaifa, 2011; Aleyomi, 2013 Omotola, 1992; Okafor, 2007; Momodu and Matudi, 2013). Consequently, PDP was fractured in August 2013, when seven state governors, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, and some other senior members formed a parallel National Executive Committee. The seven governors were Aliyu Wamakko of Sokoto (North West), Babangida Aliyu of Niger (North Central), Rabi'u Kwankwanso of Kano (North West), Murtala Nyako of Adamawa (North East), Abdulfatah Ahmed of Kwara (North Central), Sule Lamido of Jigawa (North West) and Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers (South South). With the exception of Amaechi, all others were from the North and the majority of them from the North West. The breakaway faction that named itself the new PDP (nPDP), justified their action on increasing repression, restrictions of freedom of association, arbitrary suspension of members and serial violation of the party's constitution by the chairman, Bamanga Tukur. The faction also claimed that the party chairman was backed by President Goodluck Jonathan whose only calculations were geared towards side-lining or shutting out any real or imagined opposition ahead of the party's presidential primaries for the 2015 elections. Following an 18 October, 2013 court order, which stopped the nPDP from establishing offices and barred the INEC from recognizing it as a political party, five of the seven dissident governors joined the APC. Those defections boosted the number of states controlled by the opposition to sixteen, leaving the PDP with eighteen prior to the 2015 general elections (Aniche, 2015). Difference of interest was just another form of expressing that was known as faction and therefore, faction existed in the state. The power shift formula of PDP was broken and this caused a sharp division among members of the party in the six geopolitical zones and also within the northern political class. In the North, two groups emerged. One was of the opinion that presidency should be returned to the North in 2015. The other group wanted only the vice presidency. This had created a serious rift that extended beyond the PDP. Many observers opined that it led to the downfall of the party. This is supported by the findings of Bashir and Yahaya (2015) that the 2015 re-election bid of President Goodluck contributed to the crisis. The inability of the

party leadership to resolve the crisis led to the defection of five out of the seven aggrieved governors.

The persistence of internal crisis within the PDP and the subsequent defections of the aggrieved members of the party to the opposing party was a culmination of the perennial subterranean wrangling in the party which stemmed from desperate ambitions, lack of ideological attachment to party system and gross partisan opportunism (Bashir and Yahaya, 2015). The intra-party conflict and the attendant factionalism that occurred in the PDP between 2011 and 2014 seriously affected the stability of its leadership and support base (Bashir and Yahaya, 2015). This is supported by the empirical study of factors of party selection dissidents in Nigeria, where Cohen Corentin (2015) argued that from 2006 to 2014, a fatal incident involved mainly the PDP in internal party primaries where 86% rate of dissident reached. The PDP was the main actor in crisis of candidate selection mostly. It recorded the largest number of fatalities related to party internal disputes.

The paper also examined the effect of party benefactor on credible candidates' selection. A simple regression analysis showed a significant regression with party benefactors as independent variable and candidate selection as dependent variable, in which ($B=.493$, $t=11.985$, $p=.000$). The result demonstrated that party benefactors have positive impact on candidate selection. The regression analysis further revealed that party benefactors positively and significantly affect candidate selection with F value of 143.647 and beta value of .493. Hence, an additional unit of party benefactors will increase candidate selection by .493. Therefore, party benefactors have positive relevance in party gubernatorial candidate selection. The result is positive because most of the candidates rely heavily on third party who finance their candidacy. Therefore, godfathers boost the candidacy of an aspirant but negatively affect the credibility of candidate selection. Godfathers in most cases bribed delegates to favour their godson candidates. Party benefactors were very much relevant in the PDP gubernatorial candidates' selection. In Nigeria today, political parties are no longer subscription organizations as they used to be. In PDP, those who financed the candidacy of a governor would become mostly his godfathers

who in turn would control his political activities. This has been the case since 1999 to date. In his empirical study of party politics and democratic consolidation in Nigeria, Obah-Akpowoghah argues that 90% of the respondents agreed to the assertion that godfatherism influences party primaries. Therefore, the major actors of party funding wielded enormous influence in candidate selection. The then Nigeria's ruling PDP provided relevant empirical example. By and large, party benefactors had say as to who got what in candidate selection in the PDP. Therefore, those patrons who contributed hugely to PDP funding and fully controlled their political terrain tended to crudely manipulate the selection processes to the extent that only their most favoured candidates were selected both for party offices and national elections. These powerful political patrons or their agents, perhaps because of the degree of their influence on the parties and party candidates, were popularly called *godfathers*. Thus, today, godfatherism has become a household name in the political terrain of the party. In contrast to democratic procedures, PDP employed ambiguous tactics in their candidates' selections and nomination process. Hence, the conventions, primaries and congresses were mere pretexts to celebrate the appointment of *godson* candidates (Kura, 2011). He further established a link between party funding and presidential candidates' selection in PDP. He argues that because of the relationship between party funding and candidate selection, the boundary between the two was arguably controversial and unclear. Financial "donors" (benefactor) of the PDP took over the control of its candidate selection process. They manipulated all its major activities and determined who was selected, nominated or appointed to occupy which party or public office. Godfathers had become the *owners* of the PDP. In sum, irrespective of whichever candidate selection methods employed by the PDP, godfathers had other crude (informal) methods of counteracting them. They used many terminologies such as acclimation, affirmation, zoning, endorsement, consensus, declaration or even election and the outcome would be that only candidates anointed by godfathers 'will see the light of the day.' The power of the godfathers was directly linked to their financial strength to dictate the tune.

Therefore, because Godfathers had significant influence on the internal workings of political parties, they were deliberately involved in the stability or otherwise of these parties in Nigeria. This means that the influence and power of Godfathers continued to shape and reshape the nature of internal democracy within political parties and this continued to play a significant role in understanding the crises in political parties in Nigeria (Akubo and Adejo, 2014).

Conclusion

It is evident from the above analysis that the PDP in North West Nigeria is defective in terms of candidates' selection particularly gubernatorial candidate selection. The result suggests that the party has for the period under study stacked in the turmoil of candidate selection. This is because the party stalwarts have hijacked the process especially the incumbent governors of such states. The party lost its glory simply because of defective candidates' selection. Lack of transparency and violation of party rules aided people to vote the party out of power. It is established that the party used the power of elitism, incumbency negatively. This led to its downfall in North West Nigeria. To substantiate this, experts in Nigerian party politics concluded that lack of internal democracy in PDP has become a continuous threat not to itself alone but to the Nigerian political system as a whole. This is due to the inability of the party to play the game according to the rules.

It is recommended that the party should begin a general overhaul of its laws by making stringent sanctions to its defaulting members during primary elections. Also, effective monitoring is required from the INEC so that all defaulters can be sanctioned by disqualifying them from vying to any elective position. Also, if a party is found breaching the due process of the law, the party should be de-registered.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

- i. The Fourth Republic refers to the government constituted by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which came into effect on May 29, 1999. It is the

fourth in the series of Nigeria's democratic transition since after independence in 1960.

References

- Adejumobi, Said. (2007). *Political parties in West Africa: The challenge of Democratization in Fragile States*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/Global Programme on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties.
- Agbaje, Adigun, & Adejumobi Said. (2006). Do votes count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria. *Africa Development*, 31 (3), 25-44.
- Agudiegwu, Moses Ogbonna & Ezeani, Emefiena. (2015). Party Defections and Survival of Democracy in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 4 (6), 103-112.
- Akubo, A. Aduku, & Adejo Umoru Yakubu. (2014). Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration* 2 (3), 79-108.
- Allan Ware. (1996). *Political Parties and Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Aleyomi, Michael B. (2013). Intra-Party Conflicts in Nigeria: The Case Study of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 15 (4), 281-296.
- Aniche, Ernest, Tooichi. (2015). The 'David and Goliath' or from the Ruling to the Opposition Political Party: The PDP, Crisis of Internal Democracy and 2015 Election Outcomes in Nigeria. *Social Science Research Network*. Retrieved December 13, 2015. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2659655
- Bashir, S. Ibrahim & Yahaya, Abubakar. (2015). Political Parties and Intra-Party Conflict in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In Habu Muhammed (ed.). *The Patterns and Dynamics of Party Politics in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*. Kano: Hallmark Publishing Nigeria LTD, 111-130.

- Cohen, Corentin. (2015). Violence between and within Political Parties in Nigeria: Statistics, Structures and Patterns 2006-2014. (IFRA-Nigeria Working Paper Series No.50). <http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/violence-political-parties-nigeria.pdf>
- Egboh, E. A., & Aniche, E. T. (2012). The State, Political Parties and Crisis of Internal Democracy in Nigeria: A Study of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). *Journal of Nigerian Government and Politics* 4 (1).
- European Union Election Observation Mission, Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2015). General Elections 2015: More efficient polling although increased incidents of violence and interference. Abuja: European Union Election Observation Mission Federal Republic of Nigeria. <http://www.eods.eu/library/130415-nigeria-ps2en.pdf>
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Nigerian Constitution, 1999 as amended.
- Henry, Umuoru. (2015, November 3). Primaries will no longer be hijacked by money bags-PDP. *Vanguard Newspapers*. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/primaries-will-no-longer-be-hijacked-by-money-bags-pdp/>
- Ibrahim, Jibrin. (2007). *Nigeria's 2007 Elections: The fitful path to Democratic Citizenship*. US: Institute of Peace. <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr182.pdf>
- Ikeanyibe, Okechukwu. (2014). Internal Party Democracy, Party Candidature, and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. *Politics & Policy*, 42 (5), 769-804. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266799165>
- Independent National Electoral Commission. (2015). The 2015 Presidential Election Result. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission, <http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/summary-of-results.pdf>
- Korzilius, H. (2010). Statistics, use of in case study. In A. J. Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of case study research* (Vol. 1). London: Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781412957397.n329.
- Krejcie, Robert, V., & Daryle, W. Morgan. (1970). Determining Sample Size for Research Activities. *Journal of Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 30, 607-610.
- Kura, Sulaiman Y. Balarabe. (2011). Political Parties and Democracy in Nigeria: Candidate Selection, Campaign and Party Financing in People's Democratic Party. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13 (6), 268-298.
- LaPalombra, J. & Weiner M. (1966). The Origin and Development of Political Parties. In Lapalombra and Weiner (Eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Likoti, Fako Johnson. (2005). Investigating Intra-party Democracy in Lesotho: Focus on Basutoland Congress Party and Basotho National Party. EISA occasional paper No. 39, EISA. Retrieved 15 November, 2014. <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/OP39.pdf>
- Maiyo, Josh. (2008a) Political Parties and Intra-party Democracy in East Africa: From Representative to Participatory Democracy. Unpublished Master of Philosophy thesis, the Africa Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden.
- Maiyo, Josh. (2008b, September). Preaching Water, Drinking Wine? Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East Africa: Considerations for Democratic Consolidation. Paper presented at seminar on Intra-party Democracy organised by African Studies Centre, Leiden University.
- Mann, C. J. (2003). Observational Research Methods. Research Design II: Cohort, Cross Sectional, and Case-Control Studies. *Emergency Medicine Journal* 20 (1), 54-60.
- Mbah, Peter. (2011). Party Defection and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria 1999-2009. *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 2 (2.3), 1-21.
- Mohammed, Ismail. (2015, April 17). Lack of Internal Democracy lead to PDP's Defeat. *Leadership*. [http://leadership.ng/news/426271/lack-](http://leadership.ng/news/426271/lack-of-internal-democracy-lead-to-pdp-s-defeat)

- of-internal-democracy-led-to-pdps-defeat-bamanga-tukur
- Momodu, A. Jude & Matudi, Gmanbo Ika. (2013). The Implication of Intra-Party Conflict on Nigeria's Democratisation. *Global journal of Human and Social Science*, 13 (6), 1-13.
- National Democratic Institute. (2012). *Final Report on the 2011 Nigerian General Elections*. Massachusetts: NDI-USAID, 1-61.
- Obi, Cyril. (2008). No Choice, But Democracy: Prising the People out of Politics in Africa? Paper No. 2 presented at Claude Ake Memorial Lecture organised by Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.
- Obianyo, Nkolika E., Ikenna, Alumona, & Igabariam, Campus. (2013). Democratic Decay or Democratic Autocracy? Party Primaries and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, 1999-2013. http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_29952.pdf
- Ojukwu, Chris, C. & Tope, Olaifa. (2011). Challenges of Internal Democracy in Nigeria's Political Parties: The Bane of Intra-Party Conflicts in The Peoples' Democratic Party of Nigeria. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research*, 11 (3).
- Okafor, Emeka Emmanuel. (2007). Sociological Implications of Communal and Ethno-Religious Clashes in new Democratic Nigeria. *Journal of Tribes and Tribals*, 5 (1), 35-45.
- Omoruyi, Omo. (2001). Parties and Politics in Nigeria. Paper presented at 44th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Houston, Texas.
- Omotola, J. Shola. (1992). Political parties and the quest for Political Stability in Nigeria. *Political Studies*, 24 (2), 488-511.
- Onapajo, Hakeem. (2015). How Credible Were the Nigerian 2015 General Elections? An "Electoral Integrity" Framework of Analysis. *African Renaissance: The 2015 General Elections in Nigeria*, 12 (3 & 4), 11-39.
- Owen, Oliver, & Zainab, Usman. (2015). Incumbency and Opportunity: Forecasting Trends in Nigeria's 2015 Elections. *QEH Working Paper Series*, Working Paper No. 205. <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps205.pdf>
- Peoples' Democratic Party (2014). Electoral Guidelines for Primary Elections.
- Peoples' Democratic Party (n.d). Delegates Register.
- Rahat, Gideon & Reuven, Y. Hazan. (2006). Candidate Selection: Method and Consequences. In Katz, Richard S. & William J. Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publication, 110.
- Rahat, Gideon, & Reuven, Y. Hazan. (2001). Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework. *Party Politics*. 7 (3), 297-322.
- Rahat, Gideon. (2009). Which Candidate Selection Method is the most Democratic? *Government and Opposition* 44 (1), 68-90.
- Snyder, James, M.Jr. & Michael, M. Ting. (2011). Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55 (4) 782-796.
- Tenuche, Marietu. (2011). The Albatross Called Primary Elections and Political Succession in Nigeria. *Canadian Social Science*, 7 (4), 121-130. www.cscanada.org